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What those northern rivers, the Missouri and the Columbia, were still 
struggling toward, the Colorado had become—a part of nature that had 
died and been reborn as money.1 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Federal water policy for the western United States has been 
through many changes over the past century, but at least one aspect has 
remained much the same: hydropower is a top priority.  Since the 1920s, 
the federal government has consistently supported hydropower 
development and generation, both in building and operating its own water 
projects for this purpose and in licensing non-federal hydropower 
facilities.  So important was hydropower that the federal government 
sometimes chose to license or build a project over the determined 
opposition of a State,2 despite the usual rhetoric about federal deference to 
the western States in water management.3  Large reservoirs built for 
hydropower and other purposes came to dominate several major river 
systems in the West, including the Columbia, Snake, Missouri, and 
Colorado.  As they lost their free-flowing character to dams that generated 
a stream of hydropower revenues, these rivers—in the words of historian 
Donald Worster—essentially died and were reborn as money.  
Later in the 20th century, Congress began to show greater concern 
for fish and wildlife, enacting statutes that seemed to give new weight to 
the needs of fish and wildlife affected by water development and 
management activities.  These laws, and the public values that led to their 
enactment, helped bring an end to the era of major dam construction by 
                                                          
1. DONALD WORSTER, RIVERS OF EMPIRE: WATER, ARIDITY, AND THE 
GROWTH OF THE AMERICAN WEST  276 (1985). 
2. Okla. ex rel. Phillips v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 313 U.S. 508 (1941) 
(rejecting Oklahoma’s arguments against the Corps’ Denison Dam, many of which 
were focused on they hydropower aspect of the project); Fed. Power Comm’n v. 
Oregon, 349 U.S. 435 (1955) (rejecting Oregon’s challenge to a federal license for a 
non-federal hydropower project on an important salmon-bearing river). 
3. Reed D. Benson, Deflating the Deference Myth: National Interests 
vs. State Authority under Federal Laws Affecting Water Use, 2006 UTAH L. REV. 241 
(contending that deference arguments are partly true, but largely myth). 
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the federal government.4  With the notable exception of the Endangered 
Species Act (ESA),5 however, these laws protecting fish and wildlife have 
had little to no effect on the operation of existing federal water projects. 
 Federal or not, most of the projects that generate hydropower 
today were built decades ago, before fish and wildlife protection was the 
priority that it is today.  For non-federal projects, the law has an established 
system—“relicensing” under the Federal Power Act (FPA)6—that requires 
periodic review of project operations so as to re-balance hydropower 
production against fish and wildlife protection.  For water projects 
constructed and operated by the federal government, however, no such 
standard requirement or program exists.7   
The West has hundreds of federal water projects operated by the 
Bureau of Reclamation (the Bureau) or the Army Corps of Engineers (the 
Corps).  The Bureau and the Corps have reviewed and revised the 
operation of some of their projects to address fish and wildlife concerns, 
primarily to meet the requirements of the ESA, which applies generally to 
federal dams and reservoirs.  Some laws protecting fish and wildlife only 
apply to certain facilities or river basins, however, and some of these laws 
have led to reviews at specific federal projects.  A notable example is the 
Bureau’s Glen Canyon Dam on the Colorado River, where a thorough 
                                                          
4. Donald J. Pisani, Federal Reclamation Law in the Twentieth 
Century: A Centennial Retrospective, in THE BUREAU OF RECLAMATION: HISTORY 
ESSAYS FROM THE CENTENNIAL SYMPOSIUM VOLUMES I AND II 611 (2008).  Pisani, a 
leading scholar on the history of water development in the West, identifies some of 
the reasons for environmental opposition to dams, and notes that these objections were 
among several factors contributing to the end of the era of major new federal water 
projects.  Id. at 622, 625. 
5. Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–
1544. (2012)). 
6. Paul Stanton Kibel, Passage and Flow Considered Anew: Wild 
Salmon Restoration via Hydro Relicensing, 37 PUB. LAND & RESOURCES L. REV. 65 
(2016) (summarizing relicensing requirements and their potential to benefit fish 
populations affected by hydropower projects). 
7. This article provides a sort of complement to one written by Paul 
Kibel in connection with the 36th Public Land Law Conference, in 2015.  Id.  That 
article discussed Federal Power Act relicensing of non-federal hydropower projects, 
and focused on environmental issues associated with salmon and other anadromous 
fishes.  This one summarizes the legal framework governing federal hydropower 
projects, and examines a recent decision on operations of Glen Canyon Dam, where 
the affected fish populations are the native humpback chub and resident trout species. 
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review and extensive public process led to a new long-term plan for 
operating one of the nation’s most important dams.    
 This article examines legal issues regarding hydropower, fish and 
wildlife at federal water projects in the West.  It begins by briefly 
explaining the legal and institutional framework for federal water projects 
that generate hydropower.  The following section summarizes relevant 
laws and policies for fish and wildlife protection in relation to federal 
hydropower operations, focusing primarily on the application of the ESA 
in this context.  The article then considers the case of Glen Canyon Dam, 
where the Bureau and the National Park Service recently adopted a new 
operating plan after an extensive review that addressed hydropower, the 
needs of two very different fish populations, and other concerns.  It 
concludes with an observation about the relative importance of 
hydropower and environmental values at federal water projects. 
 
II. HYDROPOWER PRODUCTION AND WILDLIFE PROTECTION: 
LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT 
 
A. Hydropower at federal water projects 
 
Federal water projects generate about half of all hydropower 
produced in the U.S.8  The legal, institutional, and contractual 
arrangements for federally-generated hydropower are complex, and they 
vary by region and by project.  With no hope of capturing this complexity 
and variety in a few pages, this section instead provides a brief 
introduction to the two agencies that operate the big federal projects in the 
West, the statutes that authorized these projects, and the power marketing 
administrations (PMAs) that market the power generated at these 
projects.9       
                                                          
8. Although there are far more non-federal hydropower projects than 
federal ones, the average generating capacity of a federal project is more than ten times 
larger than the non-federal average.  U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, EFFECTS OF 
CLIMATE CHANGE ON FEDERAL HYDROPOWER 7 (Jan. 2017). 
9. This paper focuses on federal water projects in the West, so it does 
not address the other major federal dam operating agency, the Tennessee Valley 
Authority.  The TVA operates reservoirs in the southeastern U.S. for hydropower and 
other purposes, and its electricity is not marketed through PMAs.  Id. 
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The Corps is responsible for flood control, which has been the 
agency’s primary purpose in building dams.10  The Corps today controls 
nearly 700 dams, many of which are multi-purpose facilities that also serve 
purposes such as supporting navigation or providing “flatwater” 
recreation.11  About 75 Corps dams also generate hydropower, and the 
total generating capacity of these power plants is 21.7 gigawatts, making 
the Corps the largest single source of hydropower generation in the United 
States.12   
The Bureau is primarily responsible for water supply, and it has 
been building projects for this purpose for over a century, since Congress 
in 1902 authorized the Interior Department to build and operate irrigation 
works.13  The Bureau would eventually build around 600 dams, and like 
those of the Corps, many serve two or more purposes.14  Here again, most 
of these dams do not generate power, but the 76 that do have a total 
generating capacity exceeding 15 gigawatts, making the Bureau the 
second-largest U.S. hydropower producer.15    
 Both Corps and Bureau projects are governed by authorizing 
statutes, whereby Congress provided for construction of the project.16  
                                                          
10. A. Dan Tarlock, A First Look at a Modern Legal Regime for a 
“Post-Modern” United States Army Corps of Engineers, 52 KAN. L. REV. 1285, 1299-
1307 (2004) (summarizing the Corps’ historical evolution as a water resources 
development and management agency). 
11. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Dam Safety Program, http://www. 
usace.army.mil/Missions/CivilWorks/DamSafetyProgram.aspx (last visited Aug. 
7, 2014). 
12. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, supra note 8, at 7. 
13. Act of June 17, 1902, Pub. L. No. 161, 32 Stat. 388 (codified in 
scattered sections of 43 U.S.C. from § 371 to § 498 (2000)). 
14. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, About Us, 
http://www.usbr.gov/main/about/ (last visited June 20, 2015). 
15. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, supra note 8, at 7. 
16. For Bureau projects, while there are general statutes that apply 
broadly to the reclamation program, “each project operates within its own legal 
framework, including project authorizing statutes and water supply contracts.  The 
authorizing statutes specify (among other things) the purposes for which the projects 
are constructed and operated ….”  Reed D. Benson, Environmental Review of Western 
Water Project Operations: Where NEPA Has Not Applied, Will It Now Protect 
Farmers from Fish? 29 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 269, 275 (2011).  As for the 
Corps, “each project is authorized by Congress with a specific set of purposes, usually 
 
 PUBLIC LAND & RESOURCES LAW REVIEW Vol. 39 
 
 
28 
Each project is authorized for one or more purposes: water supply, flood 
control, hydropower, fish and wildlife, etc.17  These authorized purposes 
determine a project’s basic operating priorities; that is, a dam authorized 
for water supply, hydropower, and recreation is constructed and operated 
to serve those specific functions.  Congress may authorize a project for 
multiple purposes with differing priorities; some projects were authorized 
with secondary purposes or “incidental” benefits.18  Multi-purpose 
projects became the norm during the boom period for federal dam 
construction, in the middle part of the 20th century, when most of the big 
projects were authorized and built.     
For any given project, the authorizing statute is typically the most 
important source of law, but more general statutes also may affect 
decisions about project operations.  One notable example is Section 301 
of the Water Supply Act of 1958,19 which provides that Congress must 
approve any “modification” of a federal reservoir project if the proposed 
                                                          
as part of a larger annual bill that encompasses multiple Corps’ and other agency 
public works requests.”  Robert Haskell Abrams, Water Federalism and the Army 
Corps of Engineers’ Role in Eastern States Water Allocation, 31 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK 
L. REV. 395, 407 (2009). 
17. e.g., Flood Control Act of 1950, 81 Pub. L. No. 516, § 204, 64 Stat. 
163, 177 (approving “[t]he plan for flood control, water conservation, and related 
purposes, in the Russian River Basin, California, … substantially in accordance with 
the recommendations of the Board of Engineers ….”); Act of July 3, 1952, 82 Pub. L 
No. 445, 66 Stat. 325 (authorizing the Interior Department to construct the Collbran 
Project in Colorado for purposes of “supplying water for the irrigation of 
approximately twenty-one thousand acres of land and for municipal, domestic, 
industrial, and stockwater uses and of producing and disposing of hydroelectric power 
and, as incidental to said purposes, for the further purpose of providing for the 
preservation and propagation of fish and wildlife ….”). 
18. For example, Congress authorized the Washita Basin Project in 
Oklahoma for the principal purposes of storing, regulating, and furnishing water for 
municipal, domestic, and industrial use, and, for the irrigation of approximately 
twenty-six thousand acres of land and of controlling floods and, as incidents to the 
foregoing for the additional purposes of regulating the flow of the Washita River, 
providing for the preservation and propagation of fish and wildlife, and of enhancing 
recreational opportunities. Act of February 25, 1956, 84 Pub. L. No. 419, ch. 71, § 1, 
70 Stat. 28. 
19. Pub. L. No. 85-500, § 301, 72 Stat. 297, 319 (codified at 43 U.S.C. 
§ 390b (2012)). 
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modification “would seriously affect the purposes for which the project 
was authorized, surveyed, planned, or constructed, or which would 
involve major structural or operational changes . . .”20  One statute requires 
the Corps “to prescribe regulations for the use of storage allocated for 
flood control or navigation at all reservoirs constructed wholly or in part 
with Federal funds provided on the basis of such purposes, and the 
operation of any such project shall be in accordance with such purposes.”21  
Another requires the Bureau, in carrying out the reclamation program of 
constructing and operating water projects, to comply with state laws 
“relating to the control, appropriation, use, or distribution of water used in 
irrigation, or any vested right acquired thereunder.22   
 While the Corps and the Bureau make operating decisions for 
most project purposes, hydropower operations are largely determined by 
the relevant federal Power Marketing Administration (PMA).  In the 
Columbia River Basin, the Bonneville Power Administration (Bonneville) 
is the relevant PMA; in the rest of the West,23 it is the Western Area Power 
Administration (Western).  The primary function of the PMAs is 
marketing hydropower produced at Corps and Bureau dams, and they sell 
it at low cost-based rates, giving preference to certain entities such as 
public utility districts and electric cooperatives.24  As between the two, 
                                                          
20. Id., 72 Stat. 297, 320 (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 390b(e).) (2012)). 
21. This is § 7 of the Flood Control Act of 1944, codified at 33 U.S.C. 
§ 709 (2012). 
22. This is § 8 of the 1902 Reclamation Act, codified at 43 U.S.C. § 
383 (2012). 
23. The only portion of the West that lies outside the Bonneville and 
Western territories is the southern Plains—Kansas, Oklahoma, and most of Texas—
which is within the territory of the Southwestern Power Administration.  That PMA 
and Western both supply power to part of Kansas.  U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, 
supra note 8, at 3. 
24. As explained in a Department of Energy (DOE) report, “PMAs 
market power from federal projects at the lowest possible rates to preference 
customers, consistent with sound business principles, so as to encourage the most 
widespread use of federal assets.  If excess power is available beyond the needs of 
preference customers, the PMAs may sell surpluses to non-preference entities.”  
Differences in the way that the PMAs operate are due to several things, including their 
statutory authorities, their role in electricity transmission, and the number and size of 
their dams.  Each PMA “is a distinct and self-contained entity within DOE, much like 
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Bonneville’s average power generation and revenue are more than double 
Western’s, but Western has nearly twice as many hydropower plants (55 
to Bonneville’s 31) and more than double the number of wholesale power 
customers.25       
The foregoing applies generally to hydropower produced by the 
Bureau or the Corps, but there is an additional wrinkle: about 150 of their 
dams have powerplants that these agencies do not operate.  These non-
federal powerplants produce power that is marketed by a utility or 
cooperative, and their operations are governed by a very different legal 
and institutional regime than the one just described.  Non-federal 
hydropower projects have been subject to federal regulatory control since 
1920, when Congress adopted a licensing scheme that is now implemented 
by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC).26  The FPA limits 
these licenses to a maximum 50-year term, at the end of which a project 
must undergo “relicensing” by FERC.  Each license contains a variety of 
conditions, including operating requirements and constraints, and 
relicensing may result in a new license with significantly changed 
operating conditions.27 
 
B. A measure of protection for fish and wildlife: potentially relevant 
federal laws 
 
While Congress emphasized new dams and reservoirs during the 
mid-20th century, in the 1960s it began to show greater concern for 
environmental protection, at least in relation to new water projects.  Most 
remarkably, the 1968 Wild and Scenic Rivers Act28 provided that 
                                                          
a wholly owned subsidiary of a corporation.”  U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, EFFECTS 
OF CLIMATE CHANGE ON FEDERAL HYDROPOWER 7 (Aug. 2013). 
25. Id. at 7, tbl.2.  Bonneville also supplies 35 percent of all the 
electricity sold within its service area, whereas Western accounts for only four percent 
of sales in its territory, which is much larger than Bonneville’s.  Id. 
26. Sam Kalen, Essay: Historical Flow of Hydroelectric Regulation: 
A Brief History, 53 IDAHO L. REV. 1 (2017) (tracing the development of federal law 
and policy on hydropower development, including the Federal Water Power Act of 
1920). 
27. Adell L. Amos, Dam Removal and Hydropower Production in the 
United States – Ushering in a New Era, 29 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 1, 15-16 (2014). 
28. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1271-1286 (2012). 
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designated rivers with “outstandingly remarkable scenic, recreational, 
geologic, fish and wildlife, historic, cultural, or other similar values, shall 
be preserved in free-flowing condition . . .”29  At existing reclamation 
projects, a 1965 statute authorized the Bureau to build and operate “public 
outdoor recreation and fish and wildlife enhancement facilities,” but not 
to revise operations for the benefit of recreation, fish, or wildlife; to the 
contrary, it required that public use of these facilities or project waters 
must be “coordinated with the other project purposes.”30   
 Congress went further in the National Environmental Policy Act 
(NEPA),31 sometimes called the “Magna Carta” of environmental laws.32  
One major motivation for NEPA was reining in the Corps and the Bureau, 
“mission agencies” that were famous for the environmental harm caused 
by their dam construction.33  Although courts have held that NEPA’s lofty 
statements of policy are basically unenforceable,34 the statute does require 
federal agencies to produce a detailed statement of environmental impacts 
and potential alternatives before taking any “major federal 
action[]significantly affecting the quality of the human environment.”35   
                                                          
29. Id. § 1271. Following this policy statement, the statute provides for 
designation of wild, scenic, or recreational river segments by Congress or by a State 
Id. § 1273. The statute prohibits FERC from licensing construction of new 
hydropower works on a designated segment, and requires any federal agency to issue 
a special report before seeking authorization or appropriations for a new federal 
project on a designated segment. Id. § 1278. 
30. Id.  § 460l-18. 
31. Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-
4347 (2012)). 
32. COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, A CITIZEN’S GUIDE TO 
THE NEPA 2 (2007) (hereinafter Guide to NEPA). 
33. A. Dan Tarlock, The Story of Calvert Cliffs: A Court Construes the 
National Environmental Policy Act to Create a Powerful Cause of Action, in 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW STORIES 77, 85 (Richard J. Lazarus & Oliver A. Houck eds., 
2005). 
34. Calvert Cliffs’ Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. U.S. Atomic Energy 
Com., 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Strycker’s Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. 
Karlen, 444 U.S. 223 (1980) (per curiam). 
35. 42 U.S.C. §4332(2)(C) (2012).  NEPA § 102(2) applies to all 
agencies of the federal government, and states several requirements in addition to the 
“detailed statement” mandate of subsection (C), one of which is to “study, develop, 
and describe appropriate alternatives to recommended courses of action in any 
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The Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) has become a standard 
prerequisite for many kinds of action by federal agencies, requiring them 
to develop and consider information on the environmental impacts of their 
proposed actions, and to provide opportunities for public participation in 
their decision-making.36  
In protecting wildlife, Congress’ boldest stroke was the ESA, 
enacted in 1973 to conserve imperiled species and the ecosystems on 
which they depend.37  The ESA protects animal and plant species listed as 
threatened or endangered under that law.38  The key ESA provision for 
federal water projects is Section 7,39 which imposes special procedural and 
substantive obligations on federal agencies.  Section 7(a)(2) requires the 
process of “consultation” with the U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service (or 
National Marine Fisheries Service) before a federal agency can take, 
authorize or fund an action that may harm a listed species.  Substantively, 
it commands that every federal agency “shall . . . insure that any action 
authorized, funded, or carried out by such agency . . . is not likely to 
jeopardize the continued existence” of any threatened species, or adversely 
modify its designated critical habitat.40  The ESA’s prohibition on agency 
actions causing jeopardy to listed species has been a source of litigation 
and political controversy since 1979, when the Supreme Court ruled that 
the federal Tellico Dam could not be completed since it would jeopardize 
the newly discovered snail darter.41    
                                                          
proposal which involves unresolved conflicts concerning alternative uses of available 
resources.”  Id. § 4332(2)(E). 
36. Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 355-
56 (1989). 
37. 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (2012). 
38. Section 4 of the ESA establishes detailed standards, procedures, 
and deadlines for the federal government’s decisions on whether to list a particular 
species as threatened or endangered under the Act. Id. § 1533. 
39. Id. § 1536.   
40. Id. § 1536(a)(2).   
41. The Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Tennessee Valley Auth. 
v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978) helped make the ESA one of the most potent 
environmental laws.  Congress later directed that the dam be completed, but largely 
preserved the law itself.  See Holly Doremus, The Story of TVA v. Hill: A Narrow 
Escape for a Broad New Law, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW STORIES 109, 132 (Richard J. 
Lazarus & Oliver A. Houck eds., 2005). 
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In the 1980s and ‘90s, Congress began taking actions that were 
more specific to addressing fish and wildlife concerns at existing water 
projects.  For the Corps, Congress conferred various environmental 
authorities, including one allowing the Corps to modify “structures and 
operations” of its projects, provided the modifications “(1) are feasible and 
consistent with the authorized project purposes, and (2) will improve the 
quality of the environment in the public interest.”42  For the Bureau, 
Congress authorized a variety of project- or basin-specific efforts intended 
to address the environmental damage caused by reclamation projects, 
typically related to impacts on fish populations; 43 most famously and 
dramatically, it enacted the Central Valley Project Improvement Act, 
which emphasized restoration of fish and wildlife populations harmed by 
the giant Central Valley Project in California and reallocated a large block 
of project water for that purpose.44  In the same vein, Congress amended 
the FPA to give greater weight to fish and wildlife concerns in FERC 
licensing (and relicensing) decisions on non-federal hydropower 
projects.45    
Thus, after authorizing the Corps and the Bureau to build hundreds 
of water projects (and the PMAs to market the power generated by these 
projects), Congress would later enact laws reflecting a greater interest in 
protecting and restoring fish and wildlife populations.  These more recent 
enactments, however, have had limited effect in “greening” federal 
hydropower operations for the benefit of fish and wildlife.  The next 
                                                          
42. 33 U.S.C. § 2309a(b) (2000).  This is often called the Corps’ 
“1135” authority, since it originated in § 1135 of the Water Resources Development 
Act of 1986.  Pub. L. No. 99-662, § 1135, 100 Stat. 4082, 4251 (1986). 
43. Reed D. Benson, New Adventures of the Old Bureau: Modern-Day 
Reclamation Statutes and Congress’s Unfinished Environmental Business, 48 HARV. 
J. ON LEGIS. 137, 167-68 (2011) (describing such statutes relating to Bureau projects 
in the Trinity, Carson-Truckee, and Yakima river basins).   
44. Id. (citing Central Valley Project Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 
102-575, § 3406 (b)(2), 106 Stat. 4600, 4706 (1992) (see provision reallocating 
800,000 acre-feet of Central Valley Project water for fish and wildlife)). 
45. Michael C. Blumm & Viki A. Nadol, The Decline of the 
Hydropower Czar and the Rise of Agency Pluralism in Hydroelectric Licensing, 26 
COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 81, 87-88 (2001) (summarizing 1986 amendments to the Federal 
Power Act giving greater weight to fish and wildlife values in hydropower licensing 
decisions). 
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section briefly examines why efforts to balance federal hydropower and 
wildlife interests are narrowly focused on ESA compliance. 
 
III. BALANCING HYDROPOWER AND FISH AT FEDERAL 
PROJECTS: IS THE ONLY TOOL A HAMMER? 
 
Given the existing legal regime applicable to federal water 
projects, the fundamental challenge for balancing hydropower with fish 
and wildlife needs is the age of the projects.  Most Corps dams are over 50 
years old,46 and the Bureau’s are even older, as about half of them were 
built before 1950.47  Thus, most projects were authorized at a time when 
Congress showed relatively little concern for fish and wildlife interests, 
and most were constructed before the dawn of modern environmental 
law.48  This problem could be solved, or at least mitigated, if the Corps and 
the Bureau regularly revisited their long-term reservoir operating plans.  
For federal water projects, however, there is no general system or program 
for reviewing and revising reservoir operations. 
 
A. No periodic review of federal hydropower operations 
 
Perhaps the most important gap in the legal framework for federal 
water projects is the lack of any requirement for periodic review of long-
term operating plans.  Congress has not heeded expert advice, going back 
                                                          
46. Army Corps of Eng’rs, Dam Safety Facts and Figures, 
http://www.usace.army.mil/Media/Fact-Sheets/Fact-Sheet-Article-View/Artlcle/590 
578/dam-safety-facts-and-figures (last visited Aug. 11, 2017) (also noting that 95 
percent of Corps dams are over 30 years old, and the average age of the Corps’ “dam 
safety portfolio” is 56 years). 
47. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, Infrastructure, http://www.usbr.gov 
/newsroom/presskit/factsheet/detail.cfm?recordid=2 (last visited Aug. 11, 2017).  As 
stated in the Bureau’s brief autobiography, “Reclamation’s last really big construction 
authorization occurred in 1968” with the authorization of the Central Arizona Project 
and others in the Colorado River Basin.  U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, BRIEF 
HISTORY 5 (2011), available at http://www.usbr.gov/history/2011NEWBRIEF 
HISTORY.pdf.  
48. COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY supra note 32, at 2 
(Noting that NEPA, signed into law on New Year’s Day of 1970, is generally 
considered the first modern environmental statute).   
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at least as far as the National Water Commission’s 1973 report, about the 
value of revising federal reservoir operations to meet changing needs.49  
Thus, federal law is less demanding on Corps and Bureau projects than it 
is on non-federal hydropower installations,50 which are reviewed through 
FERC relicensing every 30 to 50 years,51 and which may face greatly 
altered operating requirements as a result.52   
 While the law does not require reviews of federal water project 
operations, neither does it prohibit them.  In fact, the Corps’ rules 
regarding its project “water control plans”53 call for these plans to be 
reviewed and updated every ten years.54  The rules further provide that 
water control plans, “shall be revised as necessary to conform with 
changing requirements resulting from developments in the project area 
and downstream, improvements in technology, improved understanding 
of ecological response and sustainability, new legislation and other 
relevant factors, provided such revisions comply with existing federal 
regulations and established Corps policy.”55  In adopting or revising a 
                                                          
49. See Reed D. Benson, Reviewing Reservoir Operations: Can 
Federal Water Projects Adapt to Change? 42 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 353, 358-59 (2017) 
(discussing National Water Commission statements on federal reservoirs, as well as 
those of the Western Water Policy Review Advisory Commission and others). 
50. Id. at 401-05 (discussing requirements applicable to various 
agencies and explaining that Federal law is also tougher on federal land management 
agencies, which are required periodically to review and revise their land management 
plans).   
51. See Kibel, supra note 6, at 73 (noting that FERC relicensed about 
350 hydropower projects nationally from 1993 – 2005). 
52. See Dave Owen & Colin Apse, Trading Dams, 48 UNIV. CAL. 
DAVIS L. REV. 1043, 1064 (2015); see also, City of Tacoma v. Federal Energy 
Regulatory Comm’n, 460 F.3d 53 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (upholding new license conditions, 
including greatly increased flows to protect fisheries affected by the project, even 
though these new conditions could make the project uneconomical to operate).  
53. DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS, 
ENGINEERING AND DESIGN – WATER CONTROL MANAGEMENT, ENGINEER 
REGULATION NO. 1110-2-240 (May 30, 2016) (hereinafter Water Control 
Management Rule).  
54. Id. ¶ 3-2(j). 
55. Id. ¶ 3-1(e).   
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water control plan,56 the Corps must provide for public involvement,57 and 
must work with all stakeholders who may be affected by project 
operations.58   
The Bureau has no directly-parallel rule or policy on this subject, 
although it does have an internal “directive and standard”59 calling for 
regular operations and maintenance reviews of Bureau projects for various 
purposes, including to ensure effective operations, improve water 
management, and “protect public interests, safety, and the environment.”60  
Such reviews are to be conducted at least every six years,61 and are to 
consider environmental and public interest issues relating to the project. 62 
A separate directive and standard governs operations and maintenance 
reviews of powerplants at Bureau projects,63 which are also supposed to 
be completed every six years.64  The powerplant guidance, however, seems 
                                                          
56. Once adopted, a water control plan becomes the centerpiece of a 
water control manual, which “defines rules or provides guidance for direction, and 
operation, and management of water storage at an individual project or system of 
projects ….”  Id. ¶ 3-1(a). 
57. Id. ¶¶ 1-1, 5-2. 
58. The rule mandates that water control plans “will be developed in 
concert with all basin interests that are impacted or could be impacted by or have an 
influence on project regulation.  Close coordination shall be maintained with all 
appropriate international, federal, state, regional and local agencies” in developing and 
implementing water control plans.  Id. ¶ 3-2(d).   
59. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, Reclamation Manual, Directives and 
Standards FAC 01-04, Review of Operation and Maintenance (RO&M) Program 
Examination of Associated Facilities, available at http://www.usbr.gov/recman/fac/ 
fac01-04.pdf.  A parenthetical at the end of the title clarifies that this Directive and 
Standard applies only to facilities other than high- and significant-hazard dams.   
60. These are three of the nine stated purposes for these examinations.  
Id. at 7.   
61. Id. at 10. 
62. Under the heading “Content,” the document lists 19 items that an 
examination might cover, including “water operations; water management and 
conservation; … endangered species; habitat/wetlands; environmental impacts; and 
compliance with mitigation.”  Id. at 7-8. 
63. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, Reclamation Manual, Directives and 
Standards FAC 04-01, Power Review of Operation and Maintenance (PRO&M) 
Program, http://www.usbr.gov/recman/fac/fac04-01.pdf.   
64. The policy requires two types of six-year review, one of which is 
done by personnel within the project region, and the other is done by personnel from 
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entirely geared toward maintaining facilities and operational efficiency, 
and makes no mention of environmental or public interest factors.65 
 Given that both the Corps’ rules and the Bureau’s guidance call 
for periodic reviews of project operating plans, it may seem surprising that 
neither agency makes a practice of doing them.  A recent study on the 
Corps’ approach to this issue suggests cost is a major factor, as the agency 
has been reluctant to commit funds for this purpose.66  A second 
disincentive is potential controversy, as the agencies may be reluctant to 
stir up opposition from stakeholder groups that benefit from current 
operations, when maintaining the status quo would let sleeping dogs lie.67  
A third factor is litigation risk, as the Bureau or the Corps can minimize 
their exposure by continuing their established operating regimes and 
practices.68  This latter factor raises the role of NEPA in federal water 
project operating decisions, as examined in the next part. 
 
B. No NEPA review of “routine” project operations 
 
NEPA applies to a wide range of federal agency actions, and its 
environmental reviews have become a familiar requirement.  It is 
seemingly inescapable in the realm of federal land management,69 for 
                                                          
outside the region.  Id. ¶ 3.  The policy calls for these reviews to alternate, so that one 
of them is done every three years for a particular powerplant.  Id. ¶ 5.   
65. A separate Reclamation Manual Policy on hydropower addresses 
these issues only in the most general terms, stating a policy “to seek an appropriate 
balance among multiple purposes,” and to “comply with all Federal and state 
environmental laws, as appropriate, in developing, implementing [sic]our power 
program.”  U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, Reclamation Manual, Policy FAC P04, 
Hydroelectric Power, available at http://www.usbr.gov/recman/fac/fac-p04.pdf.   
66. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, ARMY CORPS OF 
ENGINEERS:  EFFORTS TO ASSESS THE IMPACT OF EXTREME WEATHER EVENTS, GAO-
15-660 (2015). 
67. Benson, supra note 49, at 390-92. 
68. Id. at 392-93. 
69. See, e.g., CHRISTINE A. KLEIN, FEDERICO CHEEVER & BRET C. 
BIRDSONG, NATURAL RESOURCES LAW 122 – 23 (2nd ed. 2014) (describing NEPA as 
“a pervasive presence in federal public lands and natural resources decision-making” 
and “an integral part of the decision-making process” for federal managers of these 
resources). 
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example, and those familiar with that field might expect NEPA to apply 
similarly in the context of federal dam operations.  In fact, however, NEPA 
plays a very limited role in the Corps’ and the Bureau’s decisions 
regarding operation of their existing projects.  
The leading case on NEPA and reservoir operations, Upper Snake 
River Chapter of Trout Unlimited v. Hodel, arose from a multi-year 
drought in eastern Idaho.  Environmental and angling groups sued to force 
the Bureau to produce an EIS before cutting releases from Palisades Dam 
below 1,000 cfs, arguing that the Bureau’s proposed release of 750 cfs 
would harm the blue-ribbon fishery in the South Fork of the Snake River.70  
The district court denied the requested injunction, holding that NEPA did 
not apply to ongoing project operations which represented no change from 
established practices.71  The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed,72 in 
part because the Bureau had cut Palisades Dam releases below 1,000 cfs 
during previous droughts.73  The Ninth Circuit acknowledged that such 
low releases would harm the downstream fishery,74 but concluded that 
these impacts—and the operational decisions leading to them—were just 
a continuation of the status quo.75     
 Upper Snake involved reservoir operations for water supply, but 
courts have followed it in cases involving federal hydropower operations.  
In a case involving the Bureau’s Glen Canyon Dam on the Colorado River, 
                                                          
70. 706 F.Supp. 737, 738-39 (D. Idaho 1989). 
71. Id. at 740-41.  The court also found that the plaintiffs would suffer 
no irreparable injury, and that the balance of hardships did not favor them.  Id. at 741. 
72. Upper Snake River Chapter of Trout Unlimited v. Hodel, 921 F.2d 
232 (9th Cir. 1990). 
73. Palisades Dam had been in operation for about thirty years at the 
time the case was brought, and the court indicated that releases had fallen below 1,000 
cfs in ten of those years, for a total of 555 days—a little under five percent of all days 
the dam had operated.  Id. at 233-34. 
74. Id. at 234.  The court, however, did not reach the issue of whether 
the impact was significant for purposes of the EIS requirement, because it determined 
that the Bureau’s project operations were not “major federal action.”  Id.  
75. After noting that the Bureau had been operating the dam since 
before NEPA was enacted, and had increased and decreased releases in response to 
changing conditions throughout that history, the court concluded, “In short, they are 
doing nothing new, nor more extensive, nor other than that contemplated when the 
project was first operational.  Its operation is and has been carried on and the 
consequences have been no different than those in years past.” Id. at 235. 
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the Ninth Circuit held that no EIS or Environmental Assessment (EA) was 
needed for preparation of annual operating plans by the Bureau76 where 
those plans merely implemented a long-term operating regime adopted 
after a full EIS.77  Most recently, the Ninth Circuit held that no EIS was 
needed for a change in winter hydropower operations at a federal reservoir 
on the Pend Oreille River, even though the Corps had halted such 
operations fifteen years earlier because of their environmental impacts.78 
 The latter case, Idaho Conservation League v. Bonneville Power 
Administration, shows how far the courts are willing to go in keeping 
NEPA out of dam operating decisions.  The case involved Albeni Falls 
Dam, a multi-purpose project that forms Lake Pend Oreille and generates 
hydropower marketed by Bonneville.79  From the late 1950s through the 
mid-1990s, the Corps had operated the dam for power production during 
the winter, causing reservoir levels to rise and fall.  These fluctuations 
were problematic for the reservoir’s kokanee salmon population, leading 
to a decision to hold levels steady during the winter, a practice that 
continued from 1997 through about 2011.80  At Bonneville’s request, 
however, the Corps decided in 2011 to implement “flexible winter power 
operations” allowing reservoir levels to rise and fall by up to five feet. The 
                                                          
76. Grand Canyon Trust v. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, 691 F.3d 
1008, 1021-22 (9th Cir. 2012). 
77. See infra part III.A. 
78. Idaho Cons. League v. Bonneville Power Admin., 826 F.3d 1173, 
1176-77 (9th Cir. 2016). “According to the court, ‘In 1995, the Corps determined that 
allowing the lake’s elevation to drop during the winter months had adverse effects on 
the kokanee salmon population and so beginning in 1997 began holding the lake’s 
elevation constant.’” Id. at 1175.  
79. Id. at 1174. 
80. Id. at 1175.  The case refers to a 1995 NEPA review of Albeni Falls 
Dam operations, although the opinion is not clear on what the agencies did at that 
time, referring to both a 1995 EIS and a 1995 EA. Id. at 1176-77. 
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agencies did produce a substantial EA81 on this proposal,82 and concluded 
that it would not have significant environmental impacts.  Relying on 
Upper Snake, the Ninth Circuit held that returning to the agency’s prior 
operating practices was not a change to the status quo, despite the previous 
15 years of steady winter levels; in the court’s view, those bygone 
operating practices still counted as “existing operations” for NEPA 
purposes, meaning that no EIS was required regardless of the likely 
impacts.83     
The Albeni Falls case effectively extends Upper Snake because it 
holds that even a proposed change in operations84 does not trigger the EIS 
requirement so long as the change represents a return to the status quo ante.  
In other words, if the agency proposes to operate one of its dams in a way 
that the dam has ever operated in the past, no EIS is needed.85  The court 
reiterated that “a significant shift of direction in operating policy” would 
trigger an EIS,86 but the opinion suggests that the courts will rarely find 
such a shift if the agency can make a plausible case that its proposal is 
                                                          
81. An EA is an environmental review that is generally shorter and less 
detailed than an EIS, and is typically produced when an agency can conclude that a 
proposed action will not have significant environmental impacts.  See 40 C.F.R. § 
1508.9; (2014); Center for Envtl. Law & Policy v. Bureau of Reclamation, 655 F.3d 
1000 (9th Cir. 2012) (reviewing Bureau’s EA on proposed allocation of water in Lake 
Roosevelt for water supply). 
82. U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS & BONNEVILLE POWER ADMIN., 
ALBENI FALLS DAM FLEXIBLE WINTER POWER OPERATIONS, BONNER COUNTY, 
IDAHO, FINAL ENVTL. ASSESSMENT (2011).  The EA exceeds 100 pages, and the 
“summary” preceding the table of contents states that the agencies took comment on 
a draft EA for about 45 days. 
83. Idaho Cons. League, 826 F.3d at 1176-77. 
84. In their EA on winter operations, the agencies acknowledged, “The 
proposal is a change to the way [Albeni Falls Dam] has been operated in the winter 
time in recent years ….”  U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS & BONNEVILLE POWER 
ADMIN., supra note 82, summary page. 
85. Idaho Cons. League, 826 F.3d at 1176 (interpreting Upper Snake 
to mean that “even if an agency had only engaged in a proposed action sporadically in 
the past, … repeating that action did not change the status quo”), 1177 (noting that 
“existing operations” for NEPA purposes includes operating practices that were more 
than 15 years old, and that were halted by an earlier agency decision). 
86. Id. at 1176 (citing Grand Canyon Trust v. Bureau of Reclamation, 
691 F.3d 1008, 1022 (9th Cir. 2012)). 
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nothing it has not done before.  Thus, under this line of Ninth Circuit cases, 
an EIS may never be needed if the agency itself does not characterize its 
proposed operating regime as a major shift.  An EIS may be required if the 
Bureau or the Corps is making changes to comply with the ESA, 
however,87 which brings up the role of ESA Section 7 in federal dam 
operations. 
 
C. Endangered Species Act consultation on project operations 
 
Unlike NEPA, the ESA has affected the operations of numerous 
federal water projects—even “routine” operations of projects that predate 
its enactment.  As noted above, ESA Section 7 requires federal agencies 
to avoid taking any action that would jeopardize the survival of a 
threatened or endangered species.88  Before taking an action that could 
affect a listed species, the agency must consult with the Fish & Wildlife 
Service (or National Marine Fisheries Service) to ensure that its proposed 
action would not cause jeopardy.89  Courts have held that the ESA requires 
                                                          
87. See San Luis & Delta-Mendota Water Auth. v. Jewell, 747 F.3d 
581 (9th Cir. 2014) (requiring Bureau to prepare an EIS before selecting and 
implementing an ESA “reasonable and prudent alternative” regarding its Central 
Valley Project operations); Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries, Serv., 184 
F.Supp.3d 861 (D. Or.  2016) (same requirement, regarding operations of the Federal 
Columbia River Power System). 
88. See supra text accompanying notes 37 – 41. 
89. The Ninth Circuit, which has seen a great deal of ESA litigation, 
has summarized the consultation process as follows: 
 
In order to ensure compliance with the Act, the ESA and its 
implementing regulations require federal agencies (“action 
agencies”) to consult with the appropriate federal fish and wildlife 
agency . . . whenever their actions “may affect an endangered or 
threatened species.” See 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(a). Thus, if the agency 
determines that a particular action will have no effect on an 
endangered or threatened species, the consultation requirements are 
not triggered. If the action agency subsequently determines that its 
action is “likely to adversely affect” a protected species, it must 
engage in formal consultation. Id. Formal consultation requires that 
the consulting agency . . . issue a biological opinion determining 
whether the action is likely to jeopardize the listed species and 
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consultation if the operation of a federal water project may affect a 
protected species,90 which has made Section 7 a crucial factor in forcing 
reviews of water project operations.     
 If the relevant Service determines that the agency’s proposed 
operations would jeopardize a listed species, it must identify a “reasonable 
and prudent alternative” (RPA) that would avoid the likelihood of 
jeopardy.91  Under the ESA implementing rules, a RPA must be 
“consistent with the intended purposes of the action,” within the action 
agency’s authority and jurisdiction, and “economically and 
technologically feasible.”92  Although a RPA must avoid jeopardy, it need 
not be the best alternative for the listed species, and might actually 
represent a modest alteration of the agency’s proposed action or mitigation 
of its impacts.93  Before it adopts and implements a RPA that would require 
a change in a project’s operations, however, the agency must first produce 
an EIS on the potential impacts of the change.94 
                                                          
describing, if necessary, reasonable and prudent alternatives that will 
avoid a likelihood of jeopardy.  
 
See 16 U.S.C. § 1535(b)(3)(A); Pacific Rivers Council v. Thomas, 30 F.3d 1050, 1054 
n.8 (9th Cir. 1994) (emphasis added). 
90. See Reed D. Benson, Avoiding Jeopardy, Without the Questions: 
Recovery Implementation Programs for Endangered Species in Western River Basins, 
2 MICH. J. ENVTL.  & ADMIN. L. 473, 491-500 (describing application of ESA to 
Bureau projects in the Lower Colorado, Klamath, and Rio Grande basins), 528-29 
(noting chronic litigation over the Corps’ and Bonneville’s ESA compliance in 
operating the Federal Columbia River Power System) (2013). 
91. If the Service’s Biological Opinion finds jeopardy, it must include 
a RPA unless none can be identified.  50 C.F.R. § 402.14(h)(3) (2014).   
92. 50 C.F.R. § 402.02. (2014). 
93. Sw. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Bureau of Reclamation, 143 
F.3d 515, 523 (9th Cir. 1998) (upholding RPA for Bureau’s operation of Hoover 
Dam/Lake Mead that was much weaker than draft RPA, allowing destruction of 
existing, occupied Southwestern willow flycatcher habitat so long as the Bureau 
acquired substitute habitat). 
94. See San Luis & Delta-Mendota Water Authority v. Jewell, 747 
F.3d 581, 646 (9th Cir. 2014) (holding that the Bureau needed to comply with NEPA 
before adopting and implementing a RPA for operation of the Central Valley Project 
for purposes of complying with the ESA).   
 
2018 KEEPING POWER IN CHARGE 43 
    
 
 
The ESA’s application to federal water projects has produced 
some ferocious legal and political battles, most of which have focused on 
Bureau projects operated primarily for water supply.95  Some of the most 
important federal hydropower projects in the West, however, have also 
been the focus of ESA litigation over their operations.  These include the 
string of Corps reservoirs on the Missouri River,96 and the Bureau’s Glen 
Canyon Dam on the Colorado River.97  Undoubtedly, the most intense 
controversy over federal hydropower and endangered species has involved 
the Federal Columbia River Power System.  Plaintiffs committed to saving 
Pacific Northwest salmon have had great success in challenging the Corps’ 
and Bonneville’s ESA compliance in operating dams on the Columbia and 
Snake Rivers.98  But losing in court has not prompted the agencies to make 
dramatic changes in river operations; nearly 25 years after a federal judge 
blasted the agencies for an approach that was “too heavily geared towards 
a status quo that has allowed all forms of river activity to proceed . . . when 
the situation literally cries out for a major overhaul,”99 federal operations 
on the Columbia remained out of compliance with the ESA.100  
 Whatever else may be said about the ESA in the context of federal 
water projects, one thing remains true: it has been the most effective law 
                                                          
95. Examples include the Klamath Basin and Middle Rio Grande 
disputes of the early 2000s.  See Benson, supra note 90, at 494-500 (summarizing 
those disputes and resulting litigation).  Perhaps the most divisive current controversy 
over the ESA involves its application to the Bureau’s Central Valley Project, where 
farmers and their political allies have complained bitterly about reduced deliveries of 
irrigation water.  See, e.g. San Luis & Delta-Mendota Water Authority v. Jewell, 747 
F.3d 581. 
96. See Am. Rivers v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 271 F.Supp.2d 230 
(D.D.C. 2003); In re Operation of the Missouri River System Litigation, 421 F.3d 618 
(8th Cir. 2005). 
97. See, e.g. Grand Canyon Trust v. Bureau of Reclamation, 691 F.3d 
1008 (9th Cir. 2012). 
98. See Michael C. Blumm & Aurora Paulsen, The Role of the Judge 
in Endangered Species Act Implementation: District Judge James Redden and the 
Columbia Basin Salmon Saga, 32 STAN.  ENVTL. L.J. 87, 110-42 (2013) (describing 
around 20 years of this litigation). 
99. Idaho Dep’t of Fish & Game v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries, Serv., 850 
F.Supp. 886, 900 (D. Or. 1994), vacated as moot, 56 F.3d 1071 (9th Cir. 1995). 
100. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., 184 
F.Supp.3d 861 (D. Or. 2016). 
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in making the agencies review and revise their operations for the benefit 
of wildlife.101  The substantive and procedural requirements of Section 7, 
the judicial decisions applying these requirements to ongoing project 
operations, and the willingness of citizen groups to enforce these 
requirements in the courts, have forced the Bureau and the Corps to 
develop measures for the protection of listed species.102  While ESA 
litigation over federal water projects has been bitterly contested, and 
remains so in the Columbia and the California Central Valley, in other 
places it has prompted negotiated solutions that form the basis for 
collaborative water management and species conservation programs.103 
                                                          
101. In a 2011 report, the Bureau summarized 16 of its river restoration 
programs, every one of which was driven by the need for ESA compliance.  U.S. 
BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, BUREAU OF RECLAMATION RIVER RESTORATION 
PROGRAMS: A SUMMARY OF 16 PROGRAMS AND SHARED INSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES 
72 (Sept. 2011), available at http://www.uttoncenter.unm.edu/pdfs/USBR-Riv-Rest-
Smry.pdf. 
102. One example involves the Bureau’s operations on the Rio Grande 
in New Mexico, which were the subject of fierce ESA litigation in the early 2000s.  In 
a 2002 opinion that upheld a modest RPA for the benefit of the endangered Rio Grande 
silvery minnow, the court closed with these observations about the value of the 
lawsuit: 
 
I believe it is appropriate to compliment Plaintiffs’ counsel for their 
work on behalf of the endangered silvery minnow and the entire 
Middle Rio Grande system.  It is my impression that at the time 
this lawsuit was filed, not much was being done by the federal 
agencies, or by the other major players with interests in the middle 
Rio Grande, to confront seriously the hard, difficult issues that had 
to be addressed in order to protect the minnow, and the river, itself.  
By filing this lawsuit, the Plaintiffs’ attorney got the ball rolling, 
prompting all interested parties to come up with far-reaching 
solutions to the problems that once seemed insurmountable. 
 
Rio Grande Silvery Minnow v. Keys, 469 F.Supp.2d 973 (D. N.M. Apr. 19, 2002), 
vacated as moot, Rio Grande Silvery Minnow v. Bureau of Reclamation, 601 F.3d 
1096 (10th Cir. Apr. 21, 2010). 
103. See Benson, supra note 90, at 501-504 (summarizing such results 
in the Klamath, Middle Rio Grande, and Lower Colorado River basins, and noting 
other places where litigation led to similar outcomes). 
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While Section 7 remains vitally influential in water project 
operations, it is not the only factor underlying efforts to balance federal 
hydropower and wildlife conservation.  For one thing, in both the Colorado 
and Columbia basins, hydropower revenues provide financial support for 
conservation efforts.  This funding is particularly significant in the 
Columbia Basin, where Bonneville claims to have spent over $250 million 
in direct and program expenditures for fish and wildlife in 2015 alone;104 
in the Colorado River Basin, a portion of Western’s hydropower dollars 
support the Upper Colorado and San Juan Recovery Implementation 
Programs for endangered fish.105  In addition, some efforts to balance 
federal hydropower and wildlife values are based on statutes other than the 
ESA.  The Northwest Power Act of 1980106 set up a regional governance 
institution charged with planning for both electric power and fish and 
wildlife conservation in the Columbia Basin,107 and the Northwest Power 
and Conservation Council remains influential in guiding the basin’s fish 
and wildlife efforts.108  On the Colorado, Congress enacted the Grand 
Canyon Protection Act (GCPA) in 1992,109 directing the Interior Secretary 
to develop a new operations plan for Glen Canyon Dam that would better 
balance hydropower production with ecosystem and recreational values.  
                                                          
104. “BPA funds hundreds of fish and wildlife projects in the Columbia 
Basin, including habitat restoration, hatcheries, land acquisitions, predator control and 
research and evaluation.”  Fact Sheet, BONNEVILLE POWER ADMINISTRATION, BPA 
Invests in Fish and Wildlife (Jan. 2016), available at http://www.bpa.gov/news 
/pubs/FactSheets/fs-201601-BPA-invests-in-fish-and-wildlife.pdf (last visited Sept. 
15, 2017) Counting other categories of costs associated with fish and wildlife, BPA 
claims to have spent over $750 million for this purpose in 2015, without which its 
power rates would be about a third lower.  Id.  
105. See id.  Benson, supra note 90 at 521-25 (summarizing legislation 
authorizing federal hydropower revenues to support these programs). 
106. Pacific Northwest Electric Power Planning and Conservation Act, 
Pub. L. No. 96-501, 94 Stat. 2697, codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 839-839h (1980). 
107. See 16 U.S.C. § 839b (establishing the Pacific Northwest Electric 
Power and Conservation Planning Council).   
108. 2014 Columbia River Basin Fish and Wildlife Program, 
NORTHWEST POWER & CONSERVATION COUNCIL, http://www.nwcouncil.org/fw/ 
program/2014-12/Program (last visited Nov. 16, 2017). 
109. Pub. L. 102-575, tit. XVIII, 106 Stat. 4600, 4669 (Oct. 30, 1992). 
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Interior recently completed its second plan to comply with the GCPA, as 
explained in the next section. 
 
IV. GLEN CANYON DAM OPERATIONS: HYDROPOWER, FISH, 
AND THE GRAND CANYON 
 
Glen Canyon Dam is one of the nation’s most significant dams, 
and over the years it has been the focus of more than one controversy.110  
Much of the focus has been on the impacts of hydropower operations on 
downstream Grand Canyon National Park, which have been the subject of 
both litigation in the federal courts and legislation in Congress.  The 
Interior Department has also tackled these issues, engaging in a multi-year 
review effort that in 2016 resulted in a new long-term operating plan for 
Glen Canyon Dam. 
 
A. Background on Glen Canyon Dam Operations 
 
Congress authorized Glen Canyon Dam (Glen Canyon) in 1956 
through the Colorado River Storage Project Act,111 providing for 
construction and operation of four major storage dams112 in the Upper 
Basin of the Colorado River.113  The Act authorized these reservoirs for 
multiple purposes, including “regulating the flow of the Colorado River, 
storing water for beneficial consumptive use, [and] making it possible for 
the States of the Upper Basin to utilize” the water allocated to them by the 
                                                          
110. Most recently, Dan Beard—who served as Commissioner of 
Reclamation at the beginning of the Clinton Administration—called for removing 
Glen Canyon Dam, even putting the idea in the title of his provocative book.  DANIEL 
P. BEARD, DEADBEAT DAMS: WHY WE SHOULD ABOLISH THE BUREAU OF 
RECLAMATION AND TEAR DOWN GLEN CANYON DAM (2015). 
111. Act of April 11, 1956, § 1, 70 Stat. 105. 
112. In addition to Glen Canyon Dam on the Colorado River, the 1956 
statute authorized Curecanti Dam on the Gunnison River, Flaming Gorge Dam on the 
Green River, and Navajo Dam on the San Juan River.  Id., § 1(1).  It also authorized 
a set of smaller “participating projects” in various locations. Id., § 1(2). 
113. In the Colorado River Storage Project Act, Congress used the 
Colorado River Compact’s definition of “Upper Basin,” and defined the “Upper Basin 
States” to include Colorado, New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming.  Id., § 16, 70 Stat. 
111. 
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Colorado and Upper Colorado Compacts.114  The statute also authorized 
the dams to generate hydropower, and while it called for them to be 
operated for the greatest “practicable” power production, it also prohibited 
hydropower operations that would interfere with water supply.115  
Glen Canyon delivered benefits in the form of storage, 
hydropower, and recreation on Lake Powell, but dramatically altered the 
downstream ecosystem.  First, and most fundamentally, the dam deprived 
the downstream ecosystem of nearly all sediment, which the Colorado 
River had carried in abundance through this reach;116 the loss of sediment 
has resulted in shrinkage or loss of river beaches which are important to 
Grand Canyon rafters.  The dam also eliminated fluctuations in water 
temperature, which once varied by nearly 50 degrees Fahrenheit from 
winter to summer, but now remains a steady 46° through the year.117  These 
releases of cool, clear water support a popular rainbow trout fishery in the 
Glen Canyon reach just below the dam, but have adversely affected native 
fishes—such as the endangered humpback chub and razorback sucker—
that are now found farther downstream in the warmer waters within the 
                                                          
114. The Colorado River Compact divided the U.S. portion of the 
Colorado River Basin into the Lower Basin (Arizona, California, Nevada) and the 
Upper Basin.  The Compact then apportioned the waters of the Colorado between the 
two basins, allocating 7.5 million acre-feet of consumptive use to each.  Later, the 
Upper Colorado River Basin Compact would apportion the Upper Basin share among 
the four states, giving each state a specified percentage of the available water.  U.S. 
BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, THE COLORADO RIVER DOCUMENTS 2008 xxxix – xl 
(2010). 
115. Act of Apr. 11, 1956, § 7, 70 Stat. 105, 109.  The statute did not 
similarly limit hydropower generation to protect ecosystems or recreational uses 
downstream of the dam, however.  Thus, flow releases from Glen Canyon Dam were 
allowed to rise or fall each day by up to about 30,000 cfs.  U.S. BUREAU OF 
RECLAMATION, RECORD OF DECISION, OPERATION OF GLEN CANYON DAM, 6 (Oct. 
1996), https://www.usbr.gov/uc/rm/amp/pdfs/sp_appndxG_ROD.pdf (allowable 
daily flow fluctuations of no action alternative). 
116. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, GLEN CANYON DAM LONG-
TERM EXPERIMENTAL AND MANAGEMENT PLAN FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT 
STATEMENT, ES-43 (Oct. 2016), http://ltempeis.anl.gov/documents/final-
eis/Executive_ Summary.pdf (hereinafter LTEMP FEIS). 
117. Id. (noting that during the warmer months, water temperatures rise 
downstream by about 1.8° F for every 30 miles). 
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Grand Canyon.118  “Post-dam water releases fluctuate on a daily and 
hourly basis to maximize the value of generated power during high-
demand periods . . . result[ing] in a downstream “fluctuation zone” 
between low and high river stages (water level associated with a given 
flow) that is inundated and exposed on a daily basis.”119  While these 
fluctuations could be eliminated by changing hydropower operations, the 
temperature and sediment problems cannot be resolved without changes 
to the dam infrastructure.120      
 The GCPA specifies that Glen Canyon operations to benefit the 
Grand Canyon must be “fully consistent with and subject to” the existing 
legal framework on the Colorado River.121  Within the constraints of 
existing law, however, Congress directed the Bureau to develop new Glen 
Canyon Dam operating criteria and plans and take additional measures “to 
protect, mitigate adverse impacts to, and improve the values for which 
Grand Canyon National Park and Glen Canyon National Recreation Area 
were established, including, but not limited to natural and cultural 
resources and visitor use.”122  The GCPA also imposed several procedural 
mandates, including a requirement that the Bureau consult with the 
Colorado River Basin States, with the public, and with certain kinds of 
stakeholders in developing the new operating regime.123   
                                                          
118. Id. at ES-44.   
119. Id. at ES-43. 
120. Id. at ES-62. 
121. Key features of the existing “Law of the River” applicable to Glen 
Canyon include the Colorado River Compact; the Upper Colorado River Basin 
Compact; the 1944 treaty with Mexico; the Colorado River Storage Project Act; the 
Colorado River Basin Project Act; and the Supreme Court’s 1963 Decree in Arizona 
v. California.  See GCPA, Pub. L. 102-575, § 1802(b), 106 Stat 4669 (1992).  A more 
recent addition to the relevant legal framework is the 2007 Colorado River Interim 
Guidelines, under which annual releases from Glen Canyon Dam may be higher or 
lower than the traditional standard release of 8.23 million acre-feet. U.S. DEPARTMENT 
OF THE INTERIOR, COLORADO RIVER INTERIM GUIDELINES FOR LOWER BASIN 
SHORTAGES AND THE COORDINATED OPERATIONS FOR LAKE POWELL AND LAKE 
MEAD. (Dec. 13, 2007), https://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/programs/strategies/Record 
ofDecision.pdf. 
122. GCPA § 1802(a), 106 Stat 4669. 
123. The identified stakeholder groups included “representatives of 
academic and scientific communities; environmental organizations; the recreation 
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 The GCPA required the Bureau to complete a Glen Canyon Dam 
Environmental Impact Statement within two years of enactment.124  The 
resulting EIS, issued in 1995,125 evaluated nine alternative operating 
regimes, each with its own approach to daily fluctuations, minimum and 
maximum releases, and “ramping rates” for boosting or cutting releases.126  
The Bureau selected the Modified Low Fluctuating Flow alternative 
“because it will reduce daily flow fluctuations well below the no action 
levels (historic pattern of releases) and will provide steady high releases 
of short duration which will protect or enhance downstream resources 
while allowing limited flexibility for power operations.”127  Historic 
operations had featured large daily fluctuations in dam releases that 
usually exceeded 12,000 cfs,128 and the new plan limited these fluctuations 
to 8,000 cfs per day.129      
                                                          
industry; and contractors for the purchase of Federal power produced at Glen Canyon 
Dam.”  Id., § 1804(c)(3), 106 Stat 4671. 
124. Id., § 1803(a), 106 Stat 4670. 
125. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, OPERATION OF GLEN CANYON 
DAM, FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT, 15 (March 1995), http:// 
www.fwspubs.org/doi/suppl/10.3996/082012-JFWM-071/suppl_file/10.3996082012 
-jfwm-071.s10.pdf?code=ufws-site. 
126. Id. at 17.  A spreadsheet compares these elements across the nine 
alternatives.  The alternatives ranged from allowing even greater daily fluctuations in 
flows (up to the maximum capacity of the dam’s powerplant), to imposing a steady 
flow regime that would basically keep releases at the same level all year long.  Id., 
tbl.II-1, p. 18. 
127. U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, RECORD OF DECISION, OPERATION 
OF GLEN CANYON DAM, Appendix G-3 (Oct. 9, 1996), https://www.usbr.gov/ 
uc/rm/amp/pdfs/sp_appndxG_ROD.pdf.  A key feature of the chosen alternative was 
“beach/habitat-building flows which are scheduled high releases of short duration 
designed to rebuild high elevation sandbars, deposit nutrients, restore backwater 
channels, and provide some of the dynamics of a natural system.” Id. 
128. Daily fluctuations exceeded 12,000 cfs on nearly 60% of the days 
from 1965-1989, and exceeded 20,000 cfs on over 15% of days.  Hourly fluctuations 
exceeded 4,000 cfs over two-thirds of that time, with up-ramp rates exceeding 6,000 
cfs about one-third of the time and down-ramp rates exceeding 6,000 cfs about one-
fourth of the time.  U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, OPERATION OF GLEN CANYON 
DAM, DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT 22-23 (1993). 
129. U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, RECORD OF DECISION, OPERATION 
OF GLEN CANYON DAM, (Oct. 9, 1996).  The new decision also cut back on hourly 
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In its 1996 final decision on Glen Canyon operations, the Interior 
Department also emphasized the use of adaptive management in shaping 
operational practices,130 and launched the Glen Canyon Dam Adaptive 
Management Program (GCDAMP).131  The GCDAMP provides “an 
organization and process for cooperative integration of dam operations, 
downstream resource protection and management, and monitoring and 
research information for the purposes of protecting and improving” the 
values reflected in the GCPA.132  Within this framework, the Interior 
Department conducted a series of experimental releases from Glen 
Canyon, testing how downstream resources would respond under various 
conditions.133 
 
B. A second review and a 2016 plan for Glen Canyon operations 
 
The Interior Department first announced in 2009 that it would 
produce a new Glen Canyon Operating Plan.134  The Bureau and the 
National Park Service would jointly lead the development of the new 
LTEMP,135 and from the outset, the agencies emphasized the need for 
                                                          
fluctuations, limiting the “up-ramp” rate to 4,000 cfs and the “down-ramp” rate to 
1,500 cfs.  Id. 
130. Id. at Appendix G-10 (establishment of Adaptive Management 
Workgroup, and “development of a long-term monitoring, research, and experimental 
program which could result in some additional operational changes”). 
131. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, RECORD OF DECISION FOR THE 
GLEN CANYON DAM LONG-TERM EXPERIMENTAL AND MANAGEMENT PLAN FINAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT 12 (Dec. 2016) [hereinafter LTEMP ROD]. 
132.  Id. 
133. Lara M. Schmit, Steven P. Gloss, and Christopher N. Updike, 
Overview, in THE STATE OF THE COLORADO RIVER IN GRAND CANYON: A REPORT OF 
THE GRAND CANYON MONITORING AND RESEARCH CENTER 1991–2004 1-13 (U.S. 
GEOLOGICAL SURVEY CIRCULAR 1282) (2005). 
134. Another 19 months would pass, however, before the agency 
published its Notice of Intent to prepare an EIS on the issue.  Notice of Intent to 
Prepare a Draft Environmental Impact Statement and Conduct Public Scoping on the 
Adoption of a Long-Term Experimental and Management Plan for the Operation of 
Glen Canyon Dam, 76 Fed. Reg. 39435, 39435 (July 6, 2011) (noting that Secretary 
Salazar had announced the need for a new plan on December 10, 2009). 
135. This arrangement reflected the Bureau’s role in operating Glen 
Canyon and the Park Service’s role in managing Grand Canyon National Park, as well 
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stakeholder involvement.136  A remarkable total of 15 cooperating 
agencies participated, including three other federal agencies, six tribal 
governments, three state agencies, the Upper Colorado River Commission 
(primarily composed of representatives from the four Upper Basin states), 
and two utilities.137  The agencies also engaged the broader public, holding 
a series of public meetings at the scoping stage, hosting a two-day public 
meeting regarding preliminary alternatives, and sending e-mail notice of 
the Draft EIS to about 600 people; the Draft EIS drew over 3,000 
comments.138  The EIS addressed a wide range of topics, including effects 
on both hydropower production and riparian ecology,139 and evaluated 
seven alternatives,140 ranging from boosting hydropower generation141 to 
establishing steady year-around flows with no daily fluctuations.142 
 In December 2016, the Interior Department officially completed 
the LTEMP process by choosing Alternative D as the new plan for Glen 
Canyon Dam.143 Alternative D was essentially a hybrid of Alternatives C 
and E, the latter of which was developed and submitted by seven Colorado 
River Basin states.144  Interior deemed Alternative D the “environmentally 
                                                          
as Glen Canyon and Lake Mead National Recreation Areas.  LTEMP ROD, supra note 
131, at 1. 
136. This point appears in the second sentence of the Department’s 
initial Notice of Intent to prepare an EIS on the LTEMP.  Notice of Intent to Prepare 
a Draft Environmental Impact Statement and Conduct Public Scoping on the Adoption 
of a Long-Term Experimental and Management Plan for the Operation of Glen 
Canyon Dam, 76 Fed. Reg. at 39435. 
137. LTEMP ROD, supra note 131, at 1. 
138. LTEMP FEIS, supra note 116, at ES–17 to ES–-18. 
139. It also addressed various other values and interests, including water 
and sediment resources, air quality, tribal and cultural resources, and river-based 
recreation.  Id. at ES–8. 
140. Under the “no action” Alternative A, operations would continue as 
before (under the 1996 ROD).  Id. at ES–18. 
141. This was Alternative B, developed by the Colorado River Energy 
Distributors Association.  Id.  
142. The latter was Alternative G.  The seven alternatives are 
summarized, and their impacts presented in tabular form, id. at ES–19 to ES–-36. 
143. LTEMP ROD, supra note 131, at 2. 
144. Alternative C, by contrast, came from the federal agencies.  
LTEMP FEIS, supra note 116, at ES–19.   
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preferred alternative” among the seven considered,145 concluding that it 
“provides the best balance among downstream resources to comply with 
the GCPA to protect, mitigate adverse impacts to, and improve the natural 
and cultural resources and visitor use” in the national park units, while also 
complying with other legal requirements regarding Glen Canyon 
operations.146  A key feature of the new plan is continued reliance on the 
GCDAMP, which will prioritize “management and experimental actions; 
mitigation and environmental commitments; and research and 
monitoring” under the new plan.147    
The new plan makes very modest revisions to regular operations 
at Glen Canyon.148  It tweaks monthly release volumes to benefit sediment 
conservation,149 but also increases monthly releases in August and 
                                                          
145. Id. at ES–33. 
146. LTEMP ROD, supra note 131, at 2.  The decision noted that no 
alternative performed best across the full range of objectives and goals, but Alternative 
D did the best overall, including a more favorable regime for hydropower: 
 
Specific performance benefits of Alternative D include expected 
improvements to conditions for humpback chub, trout, and the 
aquatic food base; the least impact on vegetation, wetlands, and 
terrestrial wildlife; improvements to sandbar building potential and 
sediment conservation; maintaining or improving conditions for 
reservoir and river recreation; improving preservation of cultural 
resources; respecting and enhancing tribal resources and values; 
and limiting impacts on hydropower resources. Specific to 
hydropower, it was determined (after the initial results analysis was 
complete) that combining elements of Alternatives C and E into a 
new alternative, Alternative D, would allow for increased 
hydropower and sediment conservation performance without 
sacrificing performance for other resources such as fish, 
vegetation, cultural resources, and others.  
 
Id. at 10.  Significantly, Alternative D was supported by key interests including 
WAPA, the Navajo Nation, and perhaps most significantly the seven states of the 
Colorado River Basin. 
147. Id. at 11–15 (explaining the nature, role, and priorities of the 
GCDAMP). 
148. “Alternative D has a base hydrological pattern that incorporates a 
few improvements over the No-Action Alternative.”  Id. at 7. 
149. Id. 
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September—when electricity demands are high—rather than from April 
to June, when flows would naturally be high on the Colorado.150  Daily 
fluctuations would not change much (remaining capped at 8,000 cfs), and 
flows could still rise no faster than 4,000 cfs per hour, but could drop more 
rapidly—up to 2,500 cfs per hour, a 67% increase—to improve the 
efficiency and flexibility of hydropower operations.151  Thus, to the limited 
extent that the new LTEMP changes normal Glen Canyon operations, 
those changes largely benefit hydropower.152   
 For purposes of improving downstream resources, the LTEMP 
emphasizes a set of experimental measures in the form of mostly short-
duration releases targeted to achieve a certain objective.153  These 
measures include a variety of high-flow experiments to benefit beaches 
and sandbars;154 one set of flows intended to manage trout populations 
below the dam;155 another to support aquatic insects that are part of the 
                                                          
150. LTEMP FEIS, supra note 116, at ES–24.  Indeed, Alternative D 
was adjusted during the LTEMP process to boost flows in August at the expense of 
May and June, id. at ES–33, even though May and June were often the months of peak 
flow on the river before the dam, id. at ES–35. 
151. Id. at ES–24 to ES–25; LTEMP ROD, supra note 131, at 7. 
152. Late changes to the chosen Alternative D show the importance of 
hydropower in the LTEMP decision.  The Final EIS explains that four changes were 
made to Alternative D following completion of modeling, and two further changes 
were made after publication of the Draft EIS, all in response to input from cooperating 
agencies and stakeholders.   All six of these changes would benefit hydropower, and 
could negatively impact sediment resources.  LTEMP FEIS, supra note 116, at ES–
33.   
153. The sediment-related high flows may last up to 250 hours.  LTEMP 
ROD, supra note 131, Id. at B–18.  All the other experimental flows would last less 
than 10 days each, except for low summer flows (as explained below), which are 
precluded during the first 10 years of the LTEMP.  Id. at B–12 to B–14.  
154. There are four different types of sediment-related flows, triggered 
primarily by sediment inputs from the Paria River below the dam, allowing for 
releases of up to 45,000 cfs for periods ranging from 1 hour to 250 hours.  Id. at B–17 
to B–22. 
155. These flows are intended to reduce trout numbers, and are designed 
literally to strand juvenile trout along the shore, where they will die from dewatering, 
high water temperatures in isolated pools, or predation.  Id. at B–23.  The EIS noted 
that “several Tribes have expressed concerns” about this experiment “as a taking of 
life within the canyon without a beneficial use.”  It stated that the federal agencies 
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food base for fish in the river;156 and low summer flows that could benefit 
the humpback chub,157 but that may be implemented only during the 
second half of the LTEMP period.158  Although the plan is very 
prescriptive regarding the experimental measures that may be taken and 
the circumstances that will trigger them,159 the Record of Decision states 
that “an adaptive management-based approach that is responsive and 
flexible will be used to adapt to changing environmental and resource 
conditions and new information.”160   
For purposes of ESA compliance, the Bureau engaged in formal 
consultation with the Fish & Wildlife Service (FWS)161 regarding the 
effects of the proposed LTEMP on listed species.  The primary species of 
concern was the humpback chub, an endangered fish which has its largest 
population in the area below Glen Canyon Dam.162  FWS produced a 
                                                          
would continue working with the Tribes “to determine the most appropriate means of 
mitigated impacts on Tribal values” if these flows are implemented.  Id. at B–24. 
156. These “macroinvertebrate production flows” would involve steady 
low flows on summer weekends, intended to stabilize habitat for the larval stages of 
mayflies, stoneflies, and caddisflies, all of which provide important food sources for 
both native fish and trout.  Id. at B–31 to B–32. 
157. These low flows would be intended to raise water temperatures in 
the reach of the Little Colorado River and downstream, providing better habitat for 
growth and recruitment of endangered humpback chubs.  Unlike the other 
experimental flows in the LTEMP, which are limited to 10 days or less, these flows 
would last all summer long (up to three months).  Id. at B–28. 
158. LTEMP ROD, supra note 131, at 7; LTEMP FEIS, supra note 116, 
at ES–26 to ES–29.  Alternative C would have allowed for experimental low summer 
flows at any time, but Alternative E allowed for them only after the first ten years 
under the new plan, and Alternative D incorporated that ten-year restriction.  Id. at 
ES–28. 
159. In describing the chosen Alternative D, the LTEMP ROD takes just 
over five pages to describe its basic operational elements, LTEMP ROD, supra note 
131, at B–2 to B–7, and about 25 pages to describe the experimental features, id.  at 
B–8 to B–32 (explaining the rationale for this “condition-dependent” approach). 
160. Id. at B–9. 
161. FWS was one of the federal cooperating agencies on the LTEMP 
EIS, at ES–1. 
162. U.S. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE, BIOLOGICAL OPINION FOR THE 
GLEN CANYON LONG-TERM EXPERIMENTAL AND MANAGEMENT PLAN, COCONINO 
COUNTY, ARIZONA 24 (Nov. 2016) (attachment E of the LTEMP ROD, supra note 
131, at 24) [hereinafter LTEMP BO].  This population occupies the Colorado River 
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biological opinion concluding that the proposed LTEMP would not 
jeopardize the survival or recovery of these species or adversely modify 
their critical habitat,163 although it would have some adverse effects.164  
This biological opinion provides ESA coverage for the life of the LTEMP, 
including authorization for incidental take of listed species resulting from 
Glen Canyon operations.165     
The adoption of the final LTEMP ended a review and planning 
process that stretched from the first December of the Obama 
Administration to the last.  The next section considers some of the lessons 
of this ambitious seven-year review as they relate to other federal 
hydropower projects.  
 
C. Contemplating the LTEMP 
 
Whatever its significance for the Grand Canyon and the Colorado 
River, the LTEMP is important within the broader context of federal 
reservoir operations.  The Interior Department exercised its discretion to 
                                                          
mainstem within the Grand Canyon, but the highest numbers of chubs are in the 
tributary Little Colorado River, which is largely unaffected by dam operations. Id. at 
26.  Other listed species of concern included the razorback sucker and Kanab 
ambersnail. 
163. Id. at 69. 
164. The BO concluded that Glen Canyon Dam “base operations” 
would continue to harm humpback chub, because continued hydropeaking flows with 
increased downramp rates would increase the risk of stranding juvenile humpback 
chub, degrade nearshore rearing habitats, and limit the establishment of aquatic 
invertebrates.  In addition, implementation of the LTEMP proposal would continue to 
result in river temperatures that are more suitable for coldwater nonnative species than 
for warmwater native and nonnative fish, particularly closer to the dam. Id. at 38.  
According to the Record of Decision, however, FWS stated that the LTEMP’s 
conservation measures for humpback chub were “at least as strong, and likely 
stronger, than any reasonable and prudent measures FWS would require.”  LTEMP 
ROD, supra note 131, at 17. 
165. LTEMP BO, supra note 162, at 71–76 (incidental take statement).  
The BO requires that ESA consultation be reinitiated if LTEMP implementation 
results in incidental take that exceeds the limits in the incidental take statement; if new 
information shows unanticipated effects on listed species or their habitat; if operations 
are modified in a way that changes their impacts; or if a new species is listed under 
the ESA.  Id.  
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review the long-term operating plan of a very important reservoir.  The 
process not only included environmental review under NEPA, but also 
engagement with states, tribes, and a wide range of stakeholders.  The 
review drew on an impressive body of recent science regarding the effects 
of dam operations, and addressed how those operations would affect a 
wide array of important values.  It analyzed seven alternatives, two of 
which would have significantly changed the standard practices for daily 
and monthly releases from the reservoir.  And the process resulted in a 
new 20-year plan for both standard and experimental operations at Glen 
Canyon, based on what the agencies deemed to be the environmentally 
preferred alternative.  The merits of the outcome are debatable, but the 
Interior Department’s approach to the LTEMP review is commendable for 
its scope and inclusiveness.  
That said, the results of the LTEMP are unimpressive from an 
environmental standpoint.  The most significant change in the regular 
operating regime, allowing for more dramatic “ramp-down” flow declines, 
benefits hydropower.166  All of the late revisions to the chosen Alternative 
D favor hydropower interests alone.167  Flow regimes to benefit other 
resources are conditional, experimental, and limited to short durations; the 
most significant potential change, involving low summer flows to improve 
temperature conditions for humpback chub, was disallowed during the 
first ten years of the LTEMP implementation period.168  Thus, while the 
final LTEMP includes four different experimental flow regimes to benefit 
environmental and recreational values, its basic operating regime is geared 
toward hydropower generation and revenue.    
This ongoing emphasis on hydropower at Glen Canyon Dam 
reflects the continuing influence of institutions that prioritize power 
generation over fish, wildlife, and other environmental values.  Prior 
critiques of the adaptive management regime for Glen Canyon and the 
Colorado River have examined the ways in which hydropower interests 
                                                          
166. See supra note 152 and accompanying text. 
167. See supra note 153.  “These adjustments improved the 
performance of Alternative D for hydropower value and capacity while largely 
preserving the benefits to downstream resources for sediment, endangered fish, 
vegetation, and many other resources.”  LTEMP ROD, supra note 131, at 7 (emphasis 
added). 
168. See supra notes 154–161 and accompanying text. 
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and their allies have largely controlled outcomes in the GCDAMP, to the 
detriment of the downstream environment.169  Those interests include the 
seven Colorado River Basin states, which together hold great sway in 
major water management decisions affecting the Colorado River,170 and 
showed greater support for hydropower than environmental flows in their 
comments on the LTEMP EIS.171  One can easily view the LTEMP result 
as confirmation that hydropower still drives Glen Canyon operations most 
                                                          
169. See, e.g., Lawrence Susskind, Alejandro E. Camacho, and Todd 
Schenk, Collaborative Planning and Adaptive Management at Glen Canyon: A 
Cautionary Tale, 35 COLUM. J. ENVLT. L. 1 (2010).  The authors found that in the Glen 
Canyon Adaptive Management Work Group (AMWG), “The strongest opposition to 
flow regime change has come from power generation interests.”  Id. at 25.  They also 
determined that the seven Colorado River Basin states often aligned with hydropower 
interests in that process:  “Our review of motions voted on since the AMWG was 
created confirms that factions are entrenched:  environmental organizations, the Fish 
and Wildlife Service, and the National Park Service regularly find themselves on one 
side, while the states and power generators are often on the other side.”  Id. at 26.  See 
also Joseph M. Feller, Collaborative Management of Glen Canyon Dam: The 
Elevation of Social Engineering over Law, 8 NEV. L.J. 896, 896 (noting that the 
GDAMP “has effectively given hydropower production and non-native fisheries 
higher priorities than they are legally entitled to” at Glen Canyon) (2008). 
170. One of the best examples of this influence was the seven basin 
states’ success in developing an alternative that formed the core of the Interior 
Department’s 2007 “Interim Guidelines” decision regarding shortages and reservoir 
operations on the Colorado.  See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, RECORD OF 
DECISION, COLORADO RIVER INTERIM GUIDELINES FOR LOWER BASIN SHORTAGES 
AND THE COORDINATED OPERATIONS FOR LAKE POWELL AND LAKE MEAD (Dec. 
2007); James H. Davenport, Softening the Divides: The Seven Colorado River Basin 
States’ Recommendation to the Secretary of the Interior Regarding Lower Basin 
Shortage Guidelines and the Operation of Lakes Mead and Powell in Low Reservoir 
Conditions, 10 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 287 (2007) (explaining basin states’ proposal 
on these issues). 
171. In addressing comments on the Final EIS, the LTEMP ROD 
summarized the seven basin states’ comment as including the following points:  “(6) 
experimental low summer flows should be implemented only when they are needed 
to address immediate concerns with the humpback chub population and only upon 
careful consideration of all potentially affected resources; and (7) hydropower 
resources should be maximized consistent with the preferred alternative and in 
compliance with existing law.”  LTEMP ROD, supra note 131, at D–1 (also noting 
that the basin states had stated that high-flow experiments for sediment purposes 
should still be considered experimental). 
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of the time, leaving environmental values in the back seat.  
 While hydropower remains undeniably powerful at Glen Canyon, 
the longer view shows that it is not entirely dominant.  Following the 
enactment of the GCPA, the Interior Department adopted a new operating 
regime that considerably reduced the daily and hourly fluctuations that 
were common through the 1980s.  While it certainly can be (and has been) 
argued that the resulting regime falls short of what is needed for the 
Colorado River ecosystem, especially native fishes,172 it is undeniably true 
that the 1996 decision restricted hydropower operations for the benefit of 
aquatic and riparian resources.  A major reason the LTEMP proved 
underwhelming was that an earlier review had already struck a better 
balance between hydropower and environmental values; the irony is that 
the agency spent seven years on a second review of Glen Canyon 
operations, while most federal hydropower dams are still awaiting their 
first one. 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
Since the FPA ironically applies only to non-federal projects, 
FERC relicensing does not apply to hydropower projects operated by the 
Corps or the Bureau.  In the absence of anything like relicensing, there is 
no effective program for periodic review of federal reservoir operations, 
and no mechanism for ensuring that the operating plans for these old 
projects are consistent with today’s science, needs, and values.  The 
federal courts have exacerbated the problem by effectively exempting 
most federal water project operating decisions from NEPA.  And while the 
ESA has played a vital role in prompting reviews at several federal 
projects, it is an imperfect tool for the job, in part because it focuses 
narrowly on saving individual species rather than broadly on protecting 
aquatic and riparian ecosystems.   
The Glen Canyon Dam LTEMP represents a conceptually better 
approach, with a wider scope of review and greater opportunities for 
public and stakeholder participation.  It considered a range of operating 
alternatives and evaluated their impacts on not only endangered species, 
but also other values including game fisheries, Grand Canyon beaches, and 
                                                          
172. See, e.g., Feller, supra note 169 (arguing that Interior is violating 
the ESA by failing to make further changes to Glen Canyon operations to benefit the 
humpback chub). 
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tribal resources.  It also gave tribes, states, power customers, rafters, 
anglers, and environmentalists a rare opportunity to weigh in on the next 
20 years of reservoir operations.       
 Under the LTEMP, hydropower will continue to drive most daily 
operations at Glen Canyon Dam, although not to the extent that it did 
through the 1980s.  Environmental values remain secondary despite the 
GCPA, which elevated those values but still required the dam to be 
operated in accordance with existing laws, including the requirement of 
generating as much hydropower as “practicable.”  This kind of have-your-
cake-and-eat-it-too approach virtually assures that hydropower will 
remain a higher priority than environmental values for federal water 
projects.  It is not easy to restore life to a river that has died and been reborn 
as money. 
